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Using firm–level data from 52 countries, we investigate how a country’s institutions and business 
environment affect firms’ organizational choices and the effects of the organizational form on access 
to finance and growth.  We find that businesses are more likely to choose the corporate form in 
countries with developed financial sectors and efficient legal systems, strong shareholder and creditor 
rights, low regulatory burdens and corporate taxes and efficient bankruptcy processes. Corporations 
report fewer financing, legal and regulatory obstacles than unincorporated firms and this advantage is 
greater in countries with more developed institutions and favorable business environments. We find 
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The role that institutions play in the governance of businesses has received a great deal of attention 
recently. We know from the economics and business history literature that during the industrial 
revolution economic development was associated with the rise of the limited liability corporation. In 
the United Kingdom, for example, there was a general perception in the early years of the 19
th century 
that the prevailing partnership structure was inadequate to support the transactions required by a 
modern business. In particular, unlike corporations, then prevalent partnerships did not have a separate 
legal identity from their owners. This fact made even simple legal transactions, such as suing to 
recover damages, complex. As was noted at the time, the concomitant unlimited liability made it more 
difficult to obtain investment funds, especially from wealthy investors. 
1 As a result, in the United 
Kingdom and other leading industrial countries, there were repeated attempts to provide a better legal 
framework for the organization of business enterprise. In response, laws that authorized the formation 
of limited liability corporations were passed in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Contemporary finance research suggests that these historical concerns about organizational 
form were well founded.  We now know that a country’s legal system and corporate ownership affect 
the financing of firms (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer  and Vishny (1998, 2000) and La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer (2002, 2003)). On theoretical grounds we expect unincorporated businesses 
to suffer from difficulties in raising capital (Winton (1995)). Empirically, in a study of 11,000 German 
businesses, Harhoff, Stahl, and Woywode (1998), find that incorporated firms grow faster than 
unincorporated firms.
2  
                                                 
1 See Anderson and Tollison (1983), Dubois (1971) and especially Shannon (1931, 1934). 
2 Using Mexican data, Laeven and Woodruff (2003) argue that owners of unincorporated firms are exposed to significantly 
greater idiosyncratic risk in localities with poor legal enforcement and that, as a result, unincorporated firms are relatively 
small in such localities.   3
While historically the use of the corporate form is associated with economic development, the 
advantage of the corporate form over other forms of legal organization, such as partnerships or sole 
proprietorships, rests on institutional factors that differ across countries. There are significant 
differences in legal and financial systems around the world. In some countries corporate taxes are 
higher than personal income taxes paid by proprietors of unincorporated businesses and in others they 
are lower. The level of business regulation also differs markedly across countries.  As a result, we 
expect that the prevalence of limited liability organizational forms also differs across countries. 
In this paper we ask how institutions and business environment affect firms’ organizational 
choices and what are the effects of this organizational form on firms’ access to finance and growth. 
More specifically, the questions we ask are: 
•  Does the quality of the legal and financial systems in a country predict whether businesses 
choose to incorporate? What role does the efficiency of the bankruptcy process play? Do 
bureaucratic obstacles to incorporation significantly inhibit the process of corporation 
formation in some countries? 
•  Do unincorporated businesses face greater obstacles than corporations? Specifically, do they 
report greater financial, legal and regulatory obstacles in the operation and growth of their 
businesses? Does a country’s level of development affect the relative gains from incorporating 
a business? 
•  Is there evidence that limited liability corporations grow faster than unincorporated 
businesses? If so, does the difference in growth rates depend on the quality of institutions in 
the country? 
In addressing these questions, we use firm-level data for 52 countries from the World Business 
Environment Survey (WBES), a cross-sectional, firm-level survey that includes the assessment of   4
financial, legal and other obstacles to growth as reported by incorporated and unincorporated 
businesses.  The detailed information provided about the businesses and the inclusion of small and 
medium-size businesses make this database unique. 
We examine the role of limited liability in the choice of corporate form. We find that 
businesses are more likely to become corporations in countries with more developed financial and  
legal systems and strong creditor and shareholder rights.   We also find that firms are more likely to 
operate as unincorporated businesses in countries with weak and ineffectual bankruptcy processes.  At 
all levels of development, businesses are more likely to operate as corporations in countries where the 
tax disadvantages of doing so are smaller and where the regulatory burdens in obtaining corporate 
status are lower. 
Our results indicate that in countries with more developed institutions, incorporated businesses 
report lower obstacles to operations and growth than unincorporated businesses. Specifically, 
corporations report lower financial obstacles than unincorporated businesses in countries with more 
developed financial systems. Corporations also report lower legal obstacles than unincorporated 
businesses in countries with a tradition for using the legal system to arbitrate disputes. They report 
relatively fewer problems with corruption than unincorporated businesses in countries where 
corruption is less common.  
Incorporated businesses do not on average grow faster than unincorporated businesses. 
However, we find evidence that incorporated businesses on average grow faster than unincorporated 
businesses in countries with high-quality legal systems and institutions that support formal 
contracting—more developed financial system, less corruption, more efficient bankruptcy processes 
and shorter processes for registering businesses.
3 Taken together, our results support the view that 
                                                 
3 Thus, our results are consistent with Harhoff, Stahl, and Woywode (1998) study of the growth of firms in Germany, a 
developed country, but do not support a generalization of their findings to underdeveloped countries.   5
corporations are better adapted than unincorporated businesses for facilitating access to financial 
markets and for formal contracting with customers and investors.  Such transactions are important in 
developed economies with efficient legal systems but less so in developing countries. Unincorporated 
businesses have a comparative advantage in operating in informal environments where businesses are 
self-financing and rely on their reputations rather than on legally enforceable contractual obligations.  
Our approach complements the existing finance literature on organizational form. The early 
literature was theoretical and focused on the role of limited liability and taxes in the selection of 
organizational form.  Winton (1995), Easterbrook and Fischel (1985) and John and Senbet (1996) 
focus on the advantages of limited liability that accrue from the fact that owners are protected from 
claims by third parties for any damages that the limited liability firm causes.
4 An exception is the work 
of Gordon and McKie-Mason (1994, 1997) and Goolsbee (1998), who estimate the cost of the excess 
tax burden paid by incorporated small businesses in the United States.  Gordon and McKie-Mason 
(1997) argue that the average incorporated business must obtain an additional benefit equal to 
approximately 7 percent of its earnings each year from the incorporated state in order to compensate it 
for the excess tax burden. 
More recently, two contributions have argued that, at least in businesses that do not rely on 
external financing, partnerships have advantages over corporations.  Levin and Tadelis (2002) argue 
that partnerships have an incentive to underproduce because their incentive structures prevent them 
from correctly pricing the marginal unit of labor they employ. They show that for some businesses this 
inefficiency can create value because it allows partnerships to commit credibly not to expand output at 
the cost of lowering quality. Thus, partnerships find it easier to acquire a reputation for quality. Such 
reputations are especially valuable in environments where performance cannot be contractually 
                                                 
4 They are also protected against claims from customers and investors. However, the value of this protection is 
incorporated in market prices at which the firm transacts.   6
ensured. By contrast, Morrison and Wilhelm (2003) argue that partnerships can create value precisely 
because they permit the setting of complex incentives that are not publicly revealed. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss our conceptual framework in section 
II. The data are discussed in section III. The results are presented in section IV. Section V concludes. 




Easterbrook and Fischel (1985) argue that most of the advantages of the corporate form, such 
as limited liability, can in principle be obtained by private contracting between business proprietors or 
partners and their creditors and customers. This view holds that corporate form is largely irrelevant. 
Thus, corporations and unincorporated businesses should be able to finance their activities similarly. 
Abstracting from taxes, incorporated and unincorporated businesses would differ only in the legal and 
regulatory fees that they may incur in obtaining the requisite legal characteristics.
 5  
While the Easterbrook and Fischel (1985) view is valid in a world without transactions costs, 
the extent to which it is valid in a world with transactions costs and in countries with inefficient legal 
systems is an open question. In the limit, if property rights are sufficiently poorly defined, the legal 
form of a business is irrelevant. However, when the legal system is somewhat effective but 
recontracting around the corporate form is costly, then the choice of institutional form may be 
important. Accordingly, businesses are likely to adapt to their country’s institutions by choosing legal 
forms that allow them to enter into optimal contracts with customers and investors while economizing 
on exposure to institutional and regulatory costs.  We refer to this view as the “adaptive” view and 
                                                 
5 Ass pointed out by Anderson and Tollison (1983) and Dubois (1971), before the coming of limited liability some 
partnerships tried to approximate some features of the joint stock companies by forming trusts which were charged with 
operating the partnerships on behalf of the partners.   7
examine the institutional factors that affect firms’ choice of legal form as the institutional environment 
changes. 
Corporations and unincorporated businesses differ in several important respects. First, unlike a 
sole proprietorship or a partnership, a corporation has an independent legal identity, usually with a 
continuity of life. Management is centralized and can act on behalf of the owners. These factors permit 
the corporation to take advantage of more efficient contracting than is possible for a non-incorporated 
business with multiple owners. Second, the owners of a corporation are entitled to limited liability.  
Third, the fact that a corporation has an identity separate from its owners also usually implies that 
there is freer transferability of ownership stakes. Fourth, in many countries a corporation faces a 
different tax schedule and a different regulatory environment than an unincorporated firm. We discuss 
each of these factors below. 
Efficient Contracting 
Shannon (1934), in particular, notes that there exist significant transactions costs because the 
partnership in its pure form (or sole proprietorship) is not a separate entity from its owners. He argues 
that these costs were a major cost of this organizational form in the nineteenth century. Thus, for 
example, a partnership undergoes a change when a principal partner leaves or a new partner is added.   
These changes may affect the status of existing legal contracts and claims by and against the 
partnership.
6 In the same vein, in common law, legal disputes within partnerships carry a risk that the 
court will dissolve the partnership in settling a case between partners. This risk means that the 
incentives for a partner to sue other partners are very different from those of a shareholder suing the 
managers of a firm. Taken together, these costs suggest that a corporation is better adapted to the 
                                                 
6 Under common law, if a customer sued a partnership for non-delivery he might have had to initiate separate legal actions 
for each change in the composition of the partnership during the period of the dispute. Similarly, a partnership that sues a 
customer would have to do the same. A case in which an individual is a partner in both the plaintiff and defendant 
partnerships might not have been allowed to proceed (Shannon (1934)). A single partner could derail a legal case against 
his partnership by simply physically moving outside the jurisdiction of the British legal system.   8
complex transactions of a developed economy where disputes are mediated by the courts. Thus, a 
partnership or sole proprietorship may have a comparative advantage in an economy where firms rely 
on implicit contracts and the principal punishment for transgressions is the loss of a firm’s reputation.
7 
Limited Liability  
Business historians attach great importance to the development of the limited liability 
corporation. Intuitively, unlimited liability increases the risk borne by the owners of an unincorporated 
business. As a result of this increased risk, the owners will be unwilling to borrow enough to fund 
investment opportunities that would have been profitable in the absence of unlimited liability. 
However, the fact that the owners’ property is not protected from business creditors also increases 
their incentives to honor contracts with creditors. Thus, from the perspective of the financial 
institutions, limited liability makes lending to an incorporated business riskier, reducing their 
willingness to lend.  
Sales of ownership stakes 
Unlimited liability might affect firms’ ability to raise new capital. Winton (1995) argues that 
unlimited liability reduces a business’s pool of investors by making the value of the firm depend on 
the changing identities of its owners. This dependence discourages relatively rich investors. When 
valuing an investment opportunity in an unlimited liability business, a potential investor must not only 
value the potential of the business, but also evaluate his exposure to any losses the business may incur. 
This exposure depends on the wealth of the other investors in the business. The exposure is greater the 
greater the wealth of the investor relative to other investors. The relation between investors’ wealth 
and exposure creates an adverse selection problem that makes it costly for an unlimited liability 
business to attract wealthy, and therefore less risk-averse investors. By incorporating as a limited 
liability corporation, the business can avoid this adverse selection problem.  
                                                 
7 See Gomes (2000) for a discussion of financial contracting in economies with ineffective legal systems.   9
Carr and Mathewson (1988) argue in a similar vein that unlimited liability banks in Scotland in 
the 19
th century suffered from the inability to attract capital and thereby compete effectively with 
several banks that had limited liability by Royal Charter. This handicap was not corrected until 
banking regulations were changed to permit the banks to switch to limited liability status. Carr and 
Mathewson go beyond the economic data to also argue that the banks with limited liability used 
political means to prevent other banks from obtaining limited liability and becoming stronger 
competitors. In our context, their analysis raises the possibility that the proportion of businesses in a 
country adopting a corporate form may directly affect the potential for competition. 
Regulatory Environment 
  Finally, by incorporating, firms face a different regulatory environment compared to 
unincorporated firms.  Corporations in many countries pay higher taxes since they pay a corporate 
income tax in addition to the income and dividend taxes paid by investors.  Being incorporated may 
also subject the firm to additional government regulations such as customs and trade regulations, labor 
and safety regulations.  Incorporated firms may also be subject to greater amount of bureaucratic 
hassle and corruption.  The choice of organizational form would be determined by these potential 
costs of incorporation in addition to the benefits discussed above.  
Institutional Differences and Firm’s Choices of Legal Form 
The adaptive view suggests that in countries with well functioning legal systems,  the 
corporate firms are better adapted than unincorporated firms for obtaining access to financial markets 
and for efficient contracting with customers and investors. 
8  By contrast, an unincorporated firm is 
likely to be more adapted to operating in informal business environments where businesses rely on 
their reputations rather than on legally enforceable contractual obligations.  In such contexts the 
                                                 
8 This does not rule out the possibility that for a subset of businesses, especially service firms, partnerships may be 
superior, perhaps for the reasons identified by Levin and Tadelis (2002) or Morrison and Wilhelm (2003).   10
unincorporated form ensures that the owners of a business bear the full cost of a loss of reputation, and 
thereby provides them stronger incentives to abide by implicit agreements.
9 
The adaptive view predicts that firms are more likely to choose the corporate form in countries 
with developed financial and legal systems. Thus, according to this view corporations are more 
prevalent in countries where the legal system is efficient, where creditor and shareholder rights are 
strong, and where regulatory burdens of conducting business in the formal sector are smaller.  
The adaptive view also holds that effective bankruptcy laws, which allow creditors to take over 
and redeploy the assets of an insolvent business, have two effects on the incentives of firms to adopt 
the corporate form.  First, effective bankruptcy laws reduce the risks of external financing for 
creditors, thereby making higher leverage feasible.  Second, effective bankruptcy procedures increase 
the costs of unlimited liability to the owners of unincorporated businesses. It also creates an incentive 
for the owners to diversify away from the business, which is more easily done by the owners of a 
corporation, leading to a positive relation between the efficiency of the bankruptcy process and rate of 
incorporation. Such a relation is consistent with Winton’s (1995) model of adverse selection under 
unlimited liability in the market for ownerships stakes in businesses.  In our context, we would expect 
this adverse selection to be more significant in countries where the creditors of a failed business can 
use the legal system to quickly and efficiently recover from the owners. 
The adaptive view also predicts that unincorporated firms are more common in countries 
where the tax system imposes a heavier tax burden on incorporated firms. This effect is likely to be 
especially strong in countries with tax systems that are inefficient and open to corruption. This is 
because the additional tax filings entailed by corporate status are likely to bring an additional level of 
scrutiny by the authorities and make it more difficult  (or more expensive) to avoid taxes. 
                                                 
9 There is an interesting parallel with the venture capitalist industry in the US. Venture capitalists often require 
entrepreneurs to personally guarantee loans to their businesses, even when these businesses are nominally organized as 
limited liability firms and when the value of the investments greatly exceed the wealth of the entrepreneurs.   11
The adaptive view suggests that businesses in a country incorporate until the benefit of 
incorporation for the marginal firm equals its costs. In countries with developed financial and legal 
systems this equality is attained when a larger proportion of firms has incorporated.  However, even in 
such countries there may still be businesses for which the tax and cost advantages of remaining 
unincorporated outweighs the contractual advantages. This is consistent with the models of 
Maksimovic and Zechner (1991) and Hermalin (1994), who argue that there exists an equilibrium 
degree of organizational and financing heterogeneity among firms and that the organizational form 
better adapted to the market environment is observed more frequently.
10 
We test the following predictions of the adaptive view.  We first estimate the probability that a 
business is incorporated, as a function of the institutional and business environment and firm 
characteristics. We test whether  there exist relations between specific institutional features and the 
choice to incorporate consistent with the predictions of the adaptive view.  
Second, we test how corporations and unincorporated firms are affected by important features 
of the business environment that constrain the operation and growth of their businesses. Specifically, 
we investigate obstacles in obtaining financing, in dealing with the legal system, the corruption of 
government officials and taxes and regulations.  To do this, we correlate the reports of businesses 
describing the obstacles they face with their organizational forms and other business-level and 
country-level variables. We investigate whether incorporated firms have a comparative advantage over 
unincorporated firms when they operate in countries with better legal and financial systems  as the 
adaptive view predicts. 
                                                 
10 The argument that the proportions of different types of firms adjust in equilibrium is akin to Miller’s (1977) argument 
that firms’ capital structures adjust until the tax-advantages of debt and equity are equalized. The assumption of 
equilibrium is appropriate in this context because it is feasible for businesses to change their status by registering as 
corporations.   12
Third, we test whether the growth rates of unincorporated businesses and corporations differ 
across financial and legal systems. In common with the literature, we take firm growth as a proxy for 
profitability.
11  We expect that growth rates of firms adopting the organizational form best adapted to 
their country’s institutions, after controlling for firm characteristics, should be higher than those of 
firms not adopting the best adapted organizational form. Thus, we expect that incorporated firms to 
grow comparatively faster in countries with better functioning legal and financial systems. 
III. Data  
 
Our firm-level data are taken from the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) 
conducted under the leadership of the World Bank in 1999.   This is a size-stratified random survey 
covering more than 4,000 firms in 52 countries.
12  The main purpose of the survey was to determine 
how obstacles to firm operation and growth differ across countries and how these obstacles affect 
firms of different sizes. Unlike the commercially available firm databases covering multiple countries, 
this survey is unique in its coverage of small and medium enterprises. It groups firms into three 
categories. It defines small firms as those with  five to 50 employees.   Medium firms are those that 
employ 51 to 500 employees, and large firms are those that employ more than 500 employees.  Forty 
percent of the observations are from small firms, another 40 percent are from medium firms, and the 
remaining 20 percent are from large firms. The survey also reports whether the reporting firm is an 
unincorporated business (a sole proprietorship or a partnership) or a corporation. 
The firms in the sample were asked numerous questions on the financing and legal obstacles 
they face. They were also asked to report sales, industry, growth, age, whether the firm is an exporter, 
and numerous detailed questions about their operations. 
                                                 
11 Growth is frequently used as a proxy for performance in cross-country studies. Thus, growth is used as a proxy for 
performance at the country level by King and Levine (1993), at the industry level by Rajan and Zingales (1998), and at the 
firm level by Maksimovic and Demirguc-Kunt (1998) and Beck, Maksimovic and Demirguc-Kunt (2004). 
12 The WBES covers 80 economies.  However the sample is reduced because most firm-level or country-level variables are 
missing for 28 countries.   13
In Table I, Panel A we summarize relevant facts about GDP per capita, institutional 
development and the proportion of the sampled firms in each country that are corporations. Where 
possible, country-level variables are 1995-1999 averages. Detailed variable definitions and sources are 
provided in Appendix Table A1. Table A2 in the Appendix reports the number of firms for each 
country in the sample.   
Insert Table I here 
The countries in the sample show considerable variation in per capita income. They range from 
Haiti, with an average GDP per capita of $369 to United States and Germany, with a per capita 
income of around $30,000.  We also report the proportion of corporations in our sample in each 
country.  The proportion of businesses in our sample that are incorporated shows a wide dispersion 
across countries.  
Table I also shows several descriptors of the institutions and business environment.  Law and 
Order is an indicator of the extent of legal development that reflects the degree to which the citizens 
of a country are willing to accept the established institutions to make and implement laws and 
adjudicate disputes.  It is produced by the International Country Risk rating agency and is scored 
between 1 and 6 with higher values indicating a strong court system.  Financial development is given 
by sum of two measures.  These measures are  the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector to GDP 
and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP.  These variables are defined and discussed in 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000).   
Creditor and Shareholders Rights variables are drawn from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (LLSV, 1998) and are general indicators of investors’ protections.  We also use 
indicators identifying the legal origin of the country in our empirical analysis, obtained from LLSV 
(1998).   14
We also report several variables that directly measure the cost and benefits of incorporating a 
business. The variable Duration of Entry is an estimate, in business days, of the time it takes to obtain 
legal status to operate a firm with limited liability involved in industrial or commercial activity. The 
expected duration of meeting entry  regulations is lowest in Canada (2 days) and is highest in 
Indonesia (over 6 months). For comparison, in the US it takes 4 days for firms to obtain legal status.  
This data is obtained from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (DLLS, 2002). 
In many countries corporations are tax-disadvantaged in that the corporation pays a corporate 
income tax on its profit which is in addition to any income or dividend taxes paid by investors. We 
collect and calculate the difference between the taxes paid by investors in corporations and investors 
in unincorporated enterprises and report them as the variable Tax Disadvantage. Again, there is a wide 
variation across countries. Incorporated investors are penalized most heavily in Sweden and have the 
highest comparative advantage in Uruguay.
13 
Table I also reports two descriptors of each country’s bankruptcy process. The variable 
Absolute Priority measures whether the country’s law mandates that secured creditors of a bankrupt 
enterprise are to be paid before other claimants.
14 This measure is scaled between zero and 1 so that 
higher values imply stricter observance of priority. A high score on Absolute Priority means that 
secured creditors are paid before court costs, labour claims and tax claims. A zero on Absolute Priority 
means that court costs, labour claims, and tax claims have higher priority than secured creditors. 
The variable Time in Bankruptcy is an estimate of the actual time, in years, of the potential 
duration of contested commercial insolvency proceedings for a sample of countries. The duration of 
                                                 
13 Our measure provides a summary of the relative treatment of personal income and corporate taxes. It differs from the 
measures used by Gordon and McKie-Mason (1995, 1997) for the US which take into account the double taxation of 
corporate dividends. Our measure is consistent with theirs under the assumption that corporate owners employ tax 
avoidance strategies that eliminate taxes on dividends. 
14 The legal provisions are the threat point in any negotiations between creditors and debtors. In any specific bankruptcy 
proceedings there may be departures from absolute priority as a result of negotiations. See Senbet and Seward (1995) for a 
review of the US evidence on departures from absolute priority.    15
the insolvency procedures was estimated by local insolvency lawyers and measures the expected 
length of a contested bankruptcy. In our sample the country with the fastest process is Canada (at just 
under one year) and the country with the longest process is the Brazil  (at about ten years).  Both 
Absolute Priority and Time in Bankruptcy are obtained from World Bank (2003). 
Finally, we also report actual use of bankruptcy procedures in these countries. Percent of 
Bankruptcies is given by the ratio of number of bankruptcies to total number of registered firms.  It is 
obtained from Claessens and Klapper (2003).  
In Panel B, Table I we show the summary statistics of the firm-level variables.  The WBES 
survey asked entrepreneurs to rate the extent to which financing, legal, corruption, and taxation and 
regulation problems presented obstacles to the operation and growth of their businesses. A rating of 
one denotes no obstacle; two, a minor obstacle; three, a moderate obstacle; and four, a major obstacle. 
These ratings provide a summary measure of the extent to which the financial and the legal systems, 
corruption, taxation and regulation create obstacles to growth.  
The WBES firm-level survey data is based on un-audited self-reports by firms. This contrasts 
with accounting data where the auditing process provides a measure of quality control. However, the 
quality of the audit may vary systematically across countries and firm size.
15  Moreover, financial 
statements are used by investors and creditors, the stated purpose of the WBES survey is to evaluate 
the business environment, not firm performance. As a result, the incentives to distort data are likely to 
be much higher for financial statements than for survey responses. Also, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2004) show that there exist a positive and economically significant relation between the 
levels of these obstacles reported by firms and the growth rates of the firms. Their findings suggest 
that these variables are a good measure of the obstacles facing the reporting firms. 
                                                 
15 See, for example, Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) and Hung (2001). Note however, that the empirical findings on the 
relation between institutional development and firm growth Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2004) using WBES 
data are consistent with Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) using financial statement data.   16
The sample includes firms from manufacturing, services, construction, agriculture, and other 
industries.  Since the optimal organizational form might differ across industries, we keep track of 
potential industry effects on the choice of organizational structure by noting whether the business 
operates in manufacturing or the service industry. We also note whether the firm is an exporting firm 
or foreign owned, and control for the firm’s age. 
Panel C shows the simple correlation coefficients between incorporation rate and the country-
level variables in the study. As expected, there are negative and significant correlations between the 
rate of incorporation and the costs of incorporation (the cost of becoming incorporated and the tax 
disadvantage of paying taxes at the corporate rate). There are positive and significant correlations 
between the effectiveness of a country’s bankruptcy system (incidence of bankruptcy, speed of 
resolution and adherence to absolute priority) and the rate of incorporation. More generally, there is a 
positive relationship between the proportion of incorporated firms and the quality of a country’s legal 
and financial systems, and, in particular, shareholder rights. By contrast there is a negative relationship 




In Table II we explore the determinants of an enterprise’s decision to incorporate. We start 
with a set of predetermined control variables and then sequentially introduce each of our explanatory 
variables into a statistical model that predicts whether individual firms are incorporated or not. This 
procedure avoids the risk that multicollinearity between the explanatory variables would confound the 
relation between the dependent variable and each of the explanatory variables. 
The dependent variable is an incorporation dummy that equals one if a firm is registered as a 
corporation and zero otherwise (i.e. if the firm is a partnership or a sole proprietorship).  The control 
variables in each case are dummies for foreign ownership of the enterprise, firm size and age,   17
industrial sector (manufacturing or service), and a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm 
is an exporter and zero otherwise. We also include the log of GDP per capita as a control variable that 
proxies for the wealth level of each economy.
16 Since the advent of limited liability corporations 
historically occurred in the most developed countries, we expect GDP per capita to control for omitted 
variables related to the level of development.  All models are estimated using logit probability model 
with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.  
Insert Table II here 
As Table II shows, there exist consistent and significant relationships between several of the 
control variables and the rate of incorporation. Foreign owned firms are more likely to be 
incorporated.
17 Medium, and in particular, small firms are more likely to be partnerships or sole 
proprietorships, as are firms in the service sector. In most of the models GDP per capita is positively 
related to the rate of incorporation. 
In column 2 we see that financial development is associated with a higher rate of 
incorporation.  This is expected if the incorporation decision is made to improve the firms’ ability to 
raise new financing, particularly in financially more developed countries. We next test the hypothesis 
that a high quality legal system that protects investor rights is associated with a higher rate of 
incorporation. As Table II shows, a strong law and order tradition, and laws that respect shareholder 
and creditor rights are positively related to the formation of corporation. This is consistent with the 
notion that a separate legal identity for a business enterprise is more valuable in countries where the 
formal legal system plays an important role as an efficient arbiter in disputes.
18 Firms  in countries 
                                                 
16 Including growth rate of GDP per capita and inflation as additional controls do not lead to significant changes in our 
results.  
17This is consistent with the conjecture that the presence of foreign partners makes it difficult for partnerships to enter into 
binding contracts and makes the separate legal identity inherent in incorporation more valuable. See Shannon (1932) for a 
discussion of the historical evidence in 19
th century Britain. 
18 Interestingly, GDP per capita retains significance in our model except in the specification in which we introduce law and 
order tradition as an explanatory variable, where it loses significance.   18
with a common law origin are more likely to incorporate than firms in countries with a French civil 
law origin. This suggests that a legal origin may have a significant role in the incorporation choice 
unrelated to the existence of specific investor rights.  
Table II also shows that the incorporation rate is inversely related to the costs of incorporation. 
In countries where the incorporation process takes longer there are relatively fewer corporations 
(column 6). In countries where the corporate taxes are high relative to personal income taxes there are 
also fewer corporations (column 7).
19 Thus, the demand for incorporation is sensitive to the price of 
incorporation.
20  
We next examine the relation between the efficiency of the bankruptcy process and the rate of 
incorporation. Table II shows that there is a positive and significant relation between the likelihood 
that a firm is incorporated and the incidence of bankruptcy proceedings in its country (column 8). 
Thus, corporations appear to be greater beneficiaries of the bankruptcy protections than partnerships 
and sole proprietorships. Columns 9 and 10 of Table II also show that the proportion of corporations is 
higher in countries where the bankruptcy process allows for faster resolution and adheres to absolute 
priority. This finding is consistent with Winton’s (1995) model of adverse selection under unlimited 
liability in the market for ownerships stakes in businesses. 
 The efficiency of the bankruptcy processes may also have a direct effect on investors’ 
willingness to maintain an unlimited liability status. As the bankruptcy process becomes more 
efficient, and recovery by creditors in the event of business failure becomes more certain, the risk 
borne by the business owners increases. Incorporating as a limited liability corporation reduces that 
                                                 
19 This finding is consistent with the US evidence (Gordon and McKie-Mason (1994, 1997) and Goolsbee (1998)). 
20 We have also explored if the extent of corruption in the country has an impact on the decision to incorporate.  Using a 
country-wide corruption index which increases with lower levels of corruption, we see that incorporation is more likely 
with less corruption, and when entered into the regression without GDP per capita, this coefficient is significant at ten 
percent.  However, because corruption and GDP per capita are very highly correlated, entering them together introduces 
multicollinearity.   19
risk. Therefore, we would again expect to see a positive relation between the efficiency of the 
bankruptcy procedures and the existence of limited liability firms.
21 Thus, in countries where 
bankruptcy procedures are efficient we would expect to see, and we do find, relatively more limited 
liability businesses.  
Although it is interesting to see which one of the legal, taxation, financial, and bankruptcy 
effects dominate in determining the incorporation decision, it is difficult to identify their differential 
impact because of the large number of variables we analyse, the high level correlations between these 
variables and the limited degrees of freedom at the country level.  Nevertheless, when we include 
different groups of variables, we generally see that law and order, shareholder rights, number of 
bankruptcies and time in bankruptcy retain their significance even when entered together.  Finally, we 
create a composite indicator of institutional development and business environment, Institutions, 
which is the first principal component of Law and Order, Financial Development, Corruption, 
Duration of Entry and Time in Bankruptcy variables.
22  As reported in the last column of Table II, this 
variable is also positive and significantly correlated with the rate of incorporation.   
We next investigate directly whether the corporate form is associated with a reduction in the 
financial and other obstacles in operating a business. Our measures of obstacles are taken from the  
WBES database. In Table III we take as our dependent variables the Financing Obstacle 
(specifications (1) and (2)), Legal Obstacle (specifications (3) and (4)), Corruption Obstacle 
(specifications (5) and (6)), and the Taxes and Regulations obstacle (specifications (7) and (8)). Each 
obstacle is measured on a scale (1) – “no obstacle” to (4) – “major obstacle”.  Our principal variable of 
interest is the corporation dummy as defined above.  Here our purpose is to see if incorporated firms 
                                                 
21 However, this effect would be negated if creditors require the owners of a limited liability firm to personally guarantee 
loans. 
22 More specifically, we measure it as the fist principal component factor (with factor loadings) of Law and Order (0.55), 
Financial Development (0.43), Corruption (0.47), Duration of Entry (-0.44) and Time in Bankruptcy (-0.29).   20
report significantly different obstacles compared to partnerships or sole proprietorships, controlling for 
other firm characteristics. In addition, we also augment each specification with an appropriate 
country-level variable that measures the relevant institutional factor in each country that may create 
the obstacle. Thus, in specifications (1) and (2) which predict the level of the financing obstacles faced 
by each firm we include Financial Development. Analogously we include Law and Order in 
specifications (3) and (4) predicting the Legal Obstacle, and a country-wide index of corruption in 
specifications (5) and (6) predicting the Corruption obstacle. In specifications (7) and (8), predicting 
the Tax and Regulation obstacle, we include two country-wide control variables, Tax Diff measuring 
the tax disadvantage of the corporate form and Duration of Entry measuring the bureaucratic 
complexity of becoming incorporated. In specifications (2), (4), (6) and (8) these additional control 
variables are interacted with the corporation dummy. This interactive term is intended to identify 
whether the impact of the corporate form on the obstacles reported by firms varies with institutional 
development. Estimates are obtained using ordered probit regressions with heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors.     
Insert Table III 
Table III shows that the corporations report lower obstacles than partnerships and sole 
proprietorships. In every case the effect is statistically significant in environments where the effect is 
likely to be material. Thus, corporations report lower financing obstacles than other businesses in 
countries with more developed financial systems. They report lower legal obstacles in countries with 
more established legal traditions for settling disputes. Corporations report relatively fewer problems 
with corruption in countries with lower levels of corruption. Corporations also report fewer problems 
with taxation and regulation in countries where there taxation of corporations relative to personal 
income is less onerous and in countries with less complex regulatory requirements for incorporation.    21
This finding is consistent with the notion in Gomes (2000) that firms in countries with undeveloped 
legal systems rely heavily on reputation to enforce contracts. In such contexts the corporation’s 
defining trait, a legal existence separate from its owners, may not have much value for most 
businesses. 
We next examine the performance of incorporated firms and unincorporated firms in different 
institutional environments. Following the literature, and in view of data limitations, we compare the 
growth rates of incorporated and unincorporated businesses.
23 In Table IV we regress sales growth on 
the corporation dummy and two descriptors of the institutional environment, Law and Order and the 
Institutions, discussed above.  
Insert Table IV 
In Columns (1) and (3), we first present a basic specification, in which the firm growth rate is 
regressed on the corporation dummy, a descriptor of the institutional environment (Law and order or 
Institutions, respectively), and firm-level control variables including size dummies. The coefficient of 
the corporation dummy in this specification will be significantly different from zero if corporations on 
average have different growth rates than unincorporated businesses, controlling for the average effect 
of the institutional environment. In order to determine if the effect of incorporation varies by 
institutional environment, in additional specifications we interact the descriptors of the institutional 
environment with the corporation dummy. 
The coefficient of the corporation dummy in the first specification in Columns (1) and (3) is 
not statistically significant, implying that the growth rates of corporations and unincorporated 
businesses do not differ in general. Thus, the corporate form does not appear be associated with higher 
firm performance in general. The coefficients of Law and Order and Institutions are positive and 
                                                 
23 Growth rates of firms are used as indicators of performance in firm-level cross-country studies by Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1998), Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2004), and in the industry-level study by Rajan and Zingales 
(1998).   22
significant, indicating that, on average, businesses grow faster in countries with good institutions and 
business environments. 
 In Columns (2) and (4), we interact the corporation dummy with the Institutions and Law and 
Order, respectively. Corporations grow relatively faster in a country with good legal system and 
institutions. This is consistent with our findings in Table III that in countries with good legal systems 
and institutions, corporations face lower financing and other obstacles to the operation and growth of 
their businesses.  In other words, our results suggest that  corporations perform relatively less well 






Using firm-level data we examine how institutional differences across a cross-section of firms 
in developed and developing countries affect the proportion of businesses that incorporate. We argue 
that corporations and unincorporated businesses differ along several dimensions, such as ease of 
transactions stemming from differences in legal identity; differences in the liability of the owners that 
might affect the firms’ willingness to borrow to fund capital expenditure or for potential owners to buy 
a stake in the business; and differences in tax and regulatory environments. As a result, corporations 
are likely to be better adapted for transactions in developed countries where the formal legal system is 
used to ensure contract compliance. The advantage of corporations is reduced when firms use loss of 
reputation to assure that contracts are honored.  
Empirically, we find that businesses are more likely to adopt the corporate form in countries 
with developed financial systems, well-established legal traditions, and efficient procedures for 
resolving bankruptcy. Businesses are less likely to adopt the corporate form in countries where   23
government regulations for starting a limited liability corporation are burdensome and where corporate 
taxes are high in comparison with personal income taxes. 
More generally, we find that in countries with good business environments, corporations report 
fewer obstacles to doing business than non-corporations. Specifically, in countries with developed 
financial systems, corporations report fewer financial obstacles than other businesses. In countries 
with good legal systems, corporations report fewer legal obstacles than non-corporations. In countries 
with low levels of endemic corruption, corporations report fewer problems with corruption than non-
corporations.  However, there is very little evidence that corporations report fewer obstacles when the 
business environment is less benign --- when the financial system is undeveloped, the legal system is 
not used for settling disputes and corruption is endemic. 
Taken together our results show that the corporate form has advantages over other business 
forms in relaxing financing constraints and reducing legal obstacles. However, these advantages 
manifest only in countries with better developed financial and legal systems.  
Corporations do not in general grow faster than unincorporated businesses.  Therefore, we find 
little support for the notion that unlimited liability in general imposes significant costs on businesses 
by reducing their growth rates. We do find some evidence of higher growth of incorporated  
businesses in countries with good financial and legal institutions.    24
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Panel A. Proportion of Corporations and Country-level variables 
 
GDPPC is real GDP per capita, Financial Development equals to sum of credit to the private sector and market capitalization 
to GDP, Law and Order is a measure of the law and order tradition of a country, Corruption is a measure of corruption, Tax 
disadvantage equals to the difference of maximum of corporate tax rate minus maximum personal tax rate, Shareholder 
Rights is an index of shareholder rights from LLSV (1998), Creditor Rights is an index of creditor rights  from LLSV (1998), 
Duration of Entry is the time it takes to obtain legal status to operate a firm with limited liability involved in industrial or 
commercial activity, in business days, Percent of Bankruptcies is the ratio of the number of bankruptcies per year over the 
total number of registered firms in a country in that year, Time in Bankruptcy is the average duration of insolvency 
procedures for a standardize bankruptcy case, in number of years, Absolute Priority documents the order in which claims are 
paid in the insolvency process. See Table A1 for more detailed definitions and sources. 
 
Country Prop.  of 
corporations 


















Albania 0.26  807  2.95  .  **3  3  62  0  .  2.01  0.67 
Argentina 0.79  8,000  5  0.37  4  1  62  0  0.12  2.82  0.67 
Armenia 0.57  844  4  0.06  5.5  3  79  -5  .  1.94  1 
Azerbaijan 0.06  408  4.29  .  2  4  104  -10  .  2.66  0.67 
Belarus 0.48  2,235  4  0.06  1.5  2  121  0  .  2.18  0 
Bolivia 0.02  939  3  0.48  .  .  104  12  .  2.02  1 
Brazil 0.31  4,492  2.05  0.53  3  1  86  -12.5  .  10  0.33 
Bulgaria 0.3  1,415  4  0.15  4  3  30  -13  .  3.8  1 
Canada 0.64  20,549  6  1.41  5  1  2  15.6  2.96  0.8  1 
Chile 0.2  5,003  5  1.51  5  2  34  -30  0.28  5.84  0 
China 0.56  677  5  0.97  .  .  55  -15  .  2.62  1 
Colombia 0.16  2,381  2  0.39  3  0  59  0  0.16  3.03  0.33 
Costa Rica  0.63  3,692  4  0.24  .  .  80  5  .  2.51  0.67 
Croatia 0.68  3,845  5  0.03  2.5  4  50  0  .  3.1  1 
Czech  Rep.  0.3  5,158  5.14  0.84 3  3  89 -5 1.49  9.18  0.67 
Dom. Rep.  0.67  1,712  4  0.17  .  .  86  0  .  .  0 
Ecuador 0.37  1,538  3.36  0.36  2  4  90  -25  .  3.5  0 
El Salvador  0.17  1,706  3  0.37  .  .  .  -5  .  .  . 
Estonia 0.39  3,663  4  0.16  3.75  4  .  0  .  .  . 
France 0.89  27,720  5  1.27  3  0  53  -19.42  2.62  2.39  0.67 
Germany 0.36  30,794  6  1.38  1  3  45  -13  1.03  1.18  1 
Guatemala 0.44  1,503  2.14  0.16  .  .  41  2.5  .  4  0.67 
Haiti 0.2  369  2.59  0.12  .  .  .  5  .  .  . 
Honduras 0.1  708  2.05  0.27  .  .  146  -10  .  3.76  0.67 
Hungary 0.91  4,706  6  0.29  3  3.75  65  -22  1.99  2  0.67 
Indonesia  0.34  1,045  2.64  0.8  2  4  158  0 . 6  0.67 
Italy 0.94  19,646  6  0.82  1  2  62  -9  0.54  1.25  0.67 
Kazakhstan 0.33  1,315  4  .  5.25  2.75  54  0 .  3.27  0.67 
Kyrgyz Rep.  0.4  800  .  0.06  2.25  3  .  .  .  4  1 
Lithuania 0.54  1,908  4  0.2  3.75  3  62  -4  .  1.2  1 
Malaysia 0.6  4,536  4.59  3.28  4  4  56  -2  .  2.19  1 
Moldova 0.72  668  5  0.06  3.5  4  41  0  .  2.8  0.67   28
Nicaragua 0.18  435  4  0.31  .  .  68  0  .  2.27  1 
Pakistan 0.5  506  3.14  0.41  5  4  69  10  .  2.77  1 
Panama 0.48  3,124  3  0.92  .  .  19  0  .  6.5  1 
Peru 0.3  2,335  3  0.38  3  0  114  0  0.05  2.09  0.33 
Philippines 0.79  1,126  4  1.14  3  0  62  0 .  5.71  1 
Poland 0.02  3,216  5  0.16  3  2.25  58  -6  0.23  1.53  0.67 
Portugal 0.58  11,582  5  1.03  3  1  104  -2.6  0.08  2.55  0.33 
Romania 0.14  1,372  4.77  0.1  3  4  46  -7  .  3.21  0.33 
Russia 0.66  2,224  3.45  0.17  5.5  2.5  50  0  0.31  1.53  0.67 
Singapore 0.88  24,948  6  2.37  4  4  8  -2  3.06  0.71  1 
Slovak Rep.  0.55  3,805  5  0.38  2.5  4  125  -2  .  4.75  1 
Slovenia 0.42  10,233  5  0.29  2.5  4  62  10  .  1.43  0.67 
Sweden 0.98  28,258  6  1.35  3  2  18  -32  7.61  2  1 
Trinidad & Tobago  0.61  4,526  4  0.55  .  .  .  0  .  .  . 
Turkey 0.48  2,994  3.91  0.33  2  2  53  -10  0.86  1.8  0.67 
USA 0.77  29,250  6  1.79  5  1  4  -0.6  1.34  3  1 
Ukraine 0.65  867  4  0.02  2.5  4  42  -10  .  2.97  0.67 
United Kingdom  0.5  20,187  6  2.57  5  4  4  -10  1.85  1.04  1 
Uruguay 0.03  6,114  3  0.28  2  2  27  30  .  4  1 
Venezuela 0.93  3,483  4  0.19  1  .  124  0  .  4.04  1 
































   29
Panel B. Firm-Level Variables 
 
Foreign is a dummy for foreign ownership, Exporter is a dummy for exporters,  Manufacturing and Service are industry 
dummies, Small and Medium are size dummies, Obstacles are measured on a scale from 1 (no obstacle) to 4 (major obstacle).  
See Table A1 for more detailed definitions and sources. 
 
  Percent of firms that are:  Average Obstacles 
Country Foreign  Exporter 
Manufact
uring Service  Small  Medium 
Log of 





Albania  0.13 0.17 0.27 0.60 0.79 0.21 1.55 2.82 2.14 2.78 3.24 0.19
Argentina  0.35 0.30 0.34 0.52 0.31 0.48 2.90 3.01 1.55 2.37 3.38 0.09
Armenia  0.01 0.03 0.15 0.74 0.80 0.17 1.66 2.52 1.11 1.44 3.50 -0.22
Azerbaijan  0.02 0.03 0.28 0.49 0.76 0.24 1.37 2.93 2.87 2.38 2.98 -0.20
Belarus  0.12 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.43 0.47 1.60 3.14 1.46 1.67 3.39 0.01
Bolivia  0.15 0.44 0.58 0.38 0.33 0.47 2.72 3.31 1.80 2.66 3.16 0.03
Brazil  0.25 0.31 0.32 0.61 0.14 0.71 3.28 2.71 1.27 2.57 3.58 0.04
Bulgaria  0.05 0.14 0.41 0.33 0.86 0.14 1.83 3.22 2.51 2.12 3.22 0.03
Canada  0.21 0.47 0.28 0.64 0.25 0.54 3.18 2.13 1.08 1.48 2.61 0.16
Chile  0.27 0.37 0.43 0.53 0.57 0.23 3.14 2.57 1.22 1.76 2.27 0.00
China  0.31 0.31 0.67 0.33 0.64 0.17 1.53 3.14 1.91 1.52 2.14 0.05
Colombia  0.47 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.14 0.37 2.75 2.58 1.57 2.49 3.14 0.06
Costa  Rica  0.37 0.60 0.47 0.33 0.23 0.37 2.87 2.70 1.77 2.13 2.60 0.18
Croatia  0.13 0.66 0.46 0.53 0.32 0.52 3.14 3.22 1.76 2.69 3.25 0.01
Czech Rep.  0.17  0.28  0.16 0.74 0.82 0.15 1.90 3.11 2.00  2.10 3.31 0.02
Dominican  Rep.    0.30 0.51 0.67 0.23 0.14 0.33 2.87 2.51 1.38 2.42 2.98 0.22
Ecuador  0.18 0.29 0.49 0.43 0.24 0.51 2.99 3.23 2.81 3.10 3.00 -0.04
El  Salvador  0.00 0.17 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.00 3.14 3.17 1.00 3.33 3.17 -0.37
Estonia  0.21 0.59 0.35 0.53 0.56 0.38 2.01 2.52 1.44 1.67 2.70 0.29
France  0.23 0.44 0.39 0.56 0.43 0.39 2.79 2.78 1.29 1.76 3.23 0.23
Germany  0.31 0.36 0.20 0.64 0.25 0.61 2.91 2.53 1.55 1.99 3.02 0.11
Guatemala  0.14 0.23 0.35 0.51 0.47 0.35 2.63 3.00 1.58 2.38 2.63 0.18
Haiti  0.13 0.22 0.40 0.52 0.45 0.33 2.29 3.44 1.98 2.09 2.75 0.03
Honduras  0.15 0.37 0.49 0.51 0.56 0.32 2.47 2.78 2.00 2.34 2.92 0.13
Hungary  0.07 0.24 0.22 0.56 0.80 0.16 1.90 2.70 1.60 1.27 3.22 0.27
Indonesia  0.16 0.26 0.20 0.69 0.40 0.35 2.46 2.87 2.60 2.16 2.53 -0.04
Italy  0.61 0.50 0.28 0.67 0.06 0.67 3.16 1.88 1.15 1.76 3.53 0.26
Kazakhstan  0.08 0.20 0.20 0.51 0.51 0.44 1.56 3.17 1.98 2.24 3.38 -0.04
Kyrgyz  Rep.  0.10 0.16 0.33 0.31 0.44 0.53 1.56 3.39 2.75 2.30 3.64 0.00
Lithuania  0.06 0.29 0.19 0.68 0.84 0.13 1.75 2.87 2.16 2.15 3.28 -0.08
Malaysia  0.17 0.43 0.56 0.36 0.51 0.32 2.36 2.31 1.76 1.66 1.87 0.01
Moldova  0.00 0.22 0.26 0.38 0.49 0.47 1.60 3.51 2.24 2.40 3.46 -0.22
Nicaragua  0.10 0.06 0.49 0.39 0.69 0.22 2.43 3.29 2.46 2.39 3.21 0.15
Pakistan  0.17 0.49 0.51 0.47 0.40 0.41 2.48 3.28 2.49 2.61 3.21 0.07
Panama  0.22 0.43 0.30 0.65 0.26 0.35 3.13 2.09 1.43 2.43 2.52 0.11
Peru  0.16 0.11 0.38 0.43 0.43 0.27 2.49 2.97 2.44 2.35 3.30 -0.10
Philippines  0.22 0.32 0.44 0.54 0.27 0.53 2.87 2.69 2.17 2.28 3.11 0.07
Poland  0.07 0.34 0.19 0.63 0.57 0.37 2.16 2.33 1.44 2.16 3.11 0.15
Portugal  0.30 0.25 0.26 0.69 0.40 0.36 2.98 1.68 1.47 1.77 1.99 0.12  30
Romania  0.19 0.16 0.46 0.51 0.78 0.16 1.77 3.22 2.10 2.67 3.63 -0.02
Russia  0.02 0.08 0.28 0.41 0.42 0.51 1.70 3.22 1.79 2.07 3.54 0.06
Singapore  0.36 0.47 0.31 0.53 0.37 0.31 2.87 1.88 1.24 1.32 1.53 0.11
Slovak  Republic  0.06 0.51 0.27 0.60 0.67 0.31 1.84 3.37 2.00 2.11 3.32 0.04
Slovenia  0.16 0.78 0.51 0.32 0.36 0.59 2.37 2.30 1.28 2.32 2.86 0.21
Sweden  0.25 0.57 0.33 0.48 0.51 0.39 3.22 1.85 1.06 1.54 2.66 0.25
Trinidad  &  Tobago 0.18 0.58 0.45 0.39 0.45 0.39 2.97 3.05 1.82 1.41 2.86 0.19
Turkey  0.11 0.44 0.44 0.29 0.44 0.49 2.53 3.19 2.40 2.32 3.24 -0.03
USA  0.09 0.29 0.22 0.65 0.46 0.32 3.16 2.23 1.43 1.72 2.45 0.14
Ukraine  0.04 0.22 0.39 0.46 0.57 0.37 1.50 3.37 1.93 2.03 3.65 -0.06
U.K.  0.15 0.27 0.24 0.53 0.70 0.26 2.62 2.32 1.03 1.52 3.00 0.28
Uruguay  0.13 0.49 0.62 0.31 0.23 0.62 3.10 2.67 1.13 1.75 3.10 0.05
Venezuela  0.71 0.57 0.50 0.50 0.21 0.00 3.13 1.86 1.23 3.00 2.79 0.14
All  Sample  0.15 0.32 0.34 0.51 0.48 0.39 2.30 2.83 1.78 2.10 3.09 0.07
 
 





















Law  and  Order  0.21*          
Financial  development  0.13*  0.43*         
Shareholder  Rights  0.14*  -0.06*  0.11*        
Creditor  Rights  -0.05*  0.15*  -0.11*  -0.09*       
Duration  of  Entry  -0.18* -0.41* -0.29* -0.40* 0.07*         
Tax  disadvantage  -0.07* -0.22* -0.12* 0.25*  0.00  0.00       
Percent  of  Bankruptcies  0.27* 0.55* 0.52* -0.15*  0.09* -0.49*  -0.49*     
Time  in  Bankruptcy -0.12* -0.35* -0.04* -0.22* -0.16* 0.35*  -0.13* -0.03   
Absolute  Priority  0.12* 0.32* 0.28* 0.21* 0.19* -0.34*  0.24* 0.56* -0.23 
* indicates significance at 10% or better.  
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Table II 
Predicting the Choice of Incorporation 
Dependent variable is a corporation dummy that equals to one if a firm is registered as a corporation and zero otherwise (i.e. partnership or sole proprietorship). Foreign is a dummy for foreign 
ownership, Exporter is a dummy for exporters,  Manufacturing and Service are industry dummies, Small and Medium are size dummies, Obstacles are measured on a scale from 1 (no obstacle) to 4 
(major obstacle).  GDPPC is real GDP per capita, Financial Development equals to sum of credit to the private sector and market capitalization to GDP, Law and Order is a measure of the law and 
order tradition of a country, Tax disadvantage equals to the difference of maximum of corporate tax rate minus maximum personal tax rate, Shareholder Rights is an index of shareholder rights 
from LLSV (1998), Creditor Rights is an index of creditor rights  from LLSV (1998), Legal origin are dummy variables indicating French or Socialist orgin,Duration of Entry is the time it takes to 
obtain legal status to operate a firm with limited liability involved in industrial or commercial activity, in business days, Percent of Bankruptcies is the ratio of the number of bankruptcies per year 
over the total number of registered firms in a country in that year, Time in Bankruptcy is the average duration of insolvency procedures for a standardize bankruptcy case, in number of years, 
Absolute Priority documents the order in which claims are paid in the insolvency process. Institutions is an index equal to first principal component of Law and Order, Financial Development, 
Corruption, Duration of Entry, and Time in Bankruptcy. See Table A1 for more detailed definitions and sources. All models are estimated by logit with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  (11) 
Foreign  ownership    0.562 0.523 0.607 0.639 0.674 0.633 0.546 0.813 0.635 0.648 0.596 
  [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Exporter  dummy  0.13  0.112 0.072 0.136 0.068 0.144 0.153 -0.415  0.114 0.063 0.054 
  [0.107] [0.170] [0.389] [0.122] [0.408] [0.094]*  [0.061]*  [0.003]***  [0.185] [0.462] [0.541] 
Manufacturing  -0.133 -0.202 -0.115 0.021  -0.048 -0.148 -0.138 0.131  -0.135 -0.142 -0.238 
  [0.204] [0.063]*  [0.287] [0.848] [0.652] [0.177] [0.195] [0.417] [0.214] [0.188] [0.040]** 
Services  -0.288 -0.315 -0.271 -0.206 -0.205 -0.259 -0.295 -0.45  -0.234 -0.309 -0.303 
  [0.003]*** [0.002]*** [0.006]*** [0.043]**  [0.036]**  [0.010]**  [0.003]*** [0.002]*** [0.019]**  [0.002]*** [0.004]*** 
Log  of  firm  age  -0.061 -0.082 0.012  0.066  0.077  -0.051 -0.058 -0.016 -0.017 -0.073 -0.038 
  [0.122] [0.039]**  [0.768] [0.142] [0.080]*  [0.218] [0.145] [0.801] [0.680] [0.073]*  [0.365] 
Small  -1.554 -1.533 -1.717 -1.57  -1.714 -1.629 -1.607 -1.539 -1.574 -1.718 -1.668 
  [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Medium  -0.615 -0.614 -0.651 -0.608 -0.705 -0.701 -0.64  -0.54  -0.622 -0.716 -0.671 
  [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.004]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Log  GDP  PC  0.312 0.213 0.042 0.26  0.276 0.181 0.283 -0.049  0.256 0.273 -0.097 
  [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.291]  [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.539]  [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.043]** 
Financial    Development   0.158           
   [0.008]***           
Law  and  Order      0.434          
    [0.000]***          
Shareholder  rights     0.32         
     [0.000]***         
Creditor  rights    0.126         
     [0.000]***         
Legal  origin  -  Socialist      0.042        
      [ 0 . 7 1 9 ]         
Legal  origin  -  French      -0.732        
      [0.000]***        
Duration  of  Entry       -0.01       
       [0.000]***       
Tax  Disadvantage        -0.022      
        [0.000]***      
Percent  of  Bankruptcies            0.65     
         [0.000]***     
Time  in  Bankruptcy          -0.122    
          [0.000]***    
Absolute  Priority           1.199   
           [0.000]***   
Institutions                0.336 
            [0.000]*** 
Number  of  Observations  4212 3948 4142 3746 4212 3912 4142 1784 3939 3982 3605 
Number  of  Countries  53 50 52 41 53 48 52 18 48 49 44 
Robust p values in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   32
Table III 
Firm Incorporation and Obstacles 
 
Dependent variables are Financing Obstacle in models (1) and (2), Legal Obstacle in models (3) and (4), Corruption Obstacle 
in models (5) and (6), Taxes and Regulations obstacle in models (7) and (8). Each obstacle is measured on a scale (1) – “no 
obstacle” to (4) – “major obstacle”. Foreign is a dummy for foreign ownership, Exporter is a dummy for exporters,  Manufacturing and 
Service are industry dummies, Small and Medium are size dummies, GDPPC is real GDP per capita, Financial Development equals to sum 
of credit to the private sector and market capitalization to GDP, Law and Order is a measure of the law and order tradition of a country, 
Corruption is a measure of corruption, Tax disadvantage equals to the difference of maximum of corporate tax rate minus maximum 
personal tax rate, Shareholder Rights is an index of shareholder rights from LLSV (1998), Creditor Rights is an index of creditor rights  
from LLSV (1998), Duration of Entry is the time it takes to obtain legal status to operate a firm with limited liability involved in industrial 
or commercial activity, in business days, Percent of Bankruptcies is the ratio of the number of bankruptcies per year over the total number 
of registered firms in a country in that year, Time in Bankruptcy is the average duration of insolvency procedures for a standardize 
bankruptcy case, in number of years, Absolute Priority documents the order in which claims are paid in the insolvency process. See Table 
A1 for more detailed definitions and sources.  All models are estimated by ordered probit with heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors.  
       




Corruption Obstacle   Taxes and Regulations 
Obstacle  
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
Foreign ownership dummy  -0.359  -0.355  0.045  0.044  0.021  0.027  -0.258  -0.274 
  [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.363]  [0.381]  [0.692]  [0.621]  [0.000]***  [0.000]*** 
Exporter  dummy  0.091 0.094 0.103  0.106 0.034 0.036  -0.066  -0.058 
  [0.031]** [0.026]** [0.014]**  [0.012]** [0.415]  [0.390] [0.125]  [0.183] 
Manufacturing  -0.165 -0.166 -0.106  -0.105 -0.128 -0.126  -0.054  -0.054 
  [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.067]* [0.069]*  [0.026]**  [0.029]**  [0.350]  [0.352] 
Services  -0.362 -0.363 -0.059  -0.058 -0.129 -0.125  -0.124  -0.126 
  [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.272]  [0.280]  [0.017]**  [0.022]**  [0.019]**  [0.017]** 
Log of firm age  -0.07  -0.069  0.101  0.104  0.099  0.1  -0.044  -0.038 
  [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]***  [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***  [0.037]**  [0.078]* 
Small  0.189 0.189 -0.073  -0.072  0.108 0.11  0.093  0.112 
  [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.243]  [0.253]  [0.098]*  [0.093]* [0.152]  [0.085]* 
Medium  0.155 0.152 0.017  0.018 0.095 0.092  0.304  0.316 
  [0.008]*** [0.009]*** [0.756]  [0.739]  [0.108]  [0.121]  [0.000]***  [0.000]*** 
Corporation  dummy  -0.025 0.029  -0.121  0.165 -0.184 0.033  -0.039  -0.295 
  [0.507] [0.552] [0.002]***  [0.231] [0.000]***  [0.762]  [0.305]  [0.000]*** 
Log GDP PC  -0.2  -0.2  -0.159  -0.153  -0.334  -0.334  -0.186  -0.181 
  [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***  [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***  [0.000]***  [0.000]*** 
Financial  Development  -0.134  -0.08           
  [0.000]***  [0.063]*           
Financial Development *  
      Corporation Dummy 
 -0.091 
[0.071]* 
         
Law and Order       -0.109  -0.08         
    [0.000]***  [0.001]***        
Law and Order * 
      Corporation Dummy 
    -0.068 
[0.033]** 
      
Corruption         -0.116  -0.082     
       [0.000]***  [0.001]***     
Corruption *  
Corporation Dummy 
      -0.067 
[0.027]** 
  
Duration  of  entry            -0.001  -0.003 
          [0.049]**  [0.000]*** 
Tax  Disadvantage         -0.006  -0.01 
          [0.001]***  [0.000]*** 
Duration of Entry * 
    Corporation Dummy 
          0.005 
[0.000]*** 
Tax Disadvantage * 
    Corporation Dummy  
          0.006 
[0.095]* 
             
Number  of  Observations  3901 3901 3816  3816 3875 3875  3891  3891 
Number  of  Countries 50 50 52  52 52 52  48  48 
Robust  p  values  in  brackets          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;  ***  significant  at  1%          
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Table IV 
Firm Incorporation and Sales Growth 
 
Dependent variable is estimated percent of real sales growth over last 3 year. Foreign is a dummy for foreign ownership, 
Exporter is a dummy for exporters,  Manufacturing and Service are industry dummies, Small and Medium are size 
dummies, GDPPC is real GDP per capita, Financial Development equals to sum of credit to the private sector and market 
capitalization to GDP, Law and Order is a measure of the law and order tradition of a country, Institutions is an index 
equal to first principal component of Law and Order, Financial Development, Corruption, Duration of Entry, and Time in 
Bankruptcy. See Table A1 for more detailed definitions and sources.  All models are estimated by OLS with 




 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Foreign ownership dummy 0.047  0.046  0.042  0.041 
 [0.005]***  [0.006]***  [0.017]**  [0.020]** 
Exporeter dummy  0.069  0.068  0.052  0.051 
 [0.000]***  [0.000]***  [0.001]***  [0.001]*** 
Manufacturing -0.041  -0.04  -0.022  -0.022 
 [0.054]*  [0.058]*  [0.324]  [0.323] 
Services -0.004  -0.005  0.005  0.005 
 [0.834]  [0.813]  [0.804]  [0.826] 
Log of firm age  0.001  -0.001  -0.008  -0.01 
 [0.874]  [0.891]  [0.275]  [0.190] 
Small -0.077  -0.079  -0.089  -0.09 
 [0.000]***  [0.000]***  [0.000]***  [0.000]*** 
Medium -0.024  -0.025  -0.018  -0.018 
 [0.185]  [0.174]  [0.353]  [0.357] 
Corporation dummy  -0.007  -0.122  -0.013  -0.012 
 [0.626]  [0.012]**  [0.371]  [0.391] 
Law and Order   0.026  0.013     
 [0.000]***  [0.113]     
Law and Order* Corporation     0.028     
   [0.010]**  0.031  0.022 
Institutions        [0.000]***  [0.000]*** 
       0.016 
Institutions * Corporation         [0.040]** 
        
        
Observations 2769  2769  2420  2420 
R-squared 0.035  0.037  0.046  0.047 
Robust  p  values  in  brackets          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   34
Table A1. Variable Definitions and Sources 
 
Country-Level Variables 
Variable Definition  Original  source   
GDP per capita  Real per capita GDP, average 1995-99  World Development Indicators 
Financial 
Development 
Sum of credit by deposit money banks to the private sector to GDP and 
Market capitalization to GDP (whenever the latest is not available it is set to 
zero), average 1995-1999. 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine (2000). 
Law and Order   Measure of the law and order tradition of a country. It is an average over 
1995-97. It ranges from 6, strong law and order tradition, to 1, weak law 
and order tradition.  
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG). 
Corruption  Measure of corruption in government. It ranges from 1 to6 and is an 
average over 1995-97. Lower scores indicate that "high government 
officials are likely to demand special payments" and "illegal payments are 
generally expected throughout lower levels of government" in the form of 
"bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax 
assessment, policy protection, or loans.” 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG). 
Tax disadvantage Measure of tax disadvantage of corporations equal to the difference of 
maximum of corporate tax rate minus maximum personal tax rate. 
Index of Economic Freedom, 
and Price Waterhouse (2002) 




An index of shareholder rights equal to the sum of (1) proxy by mail, (2) 
deposit of shares is not required prior to the general meeting, (3) cumulative 
voting or proportional representation, (4) an oppressed minorities 
mechanism is in place, (5) minimum percentage to call extraordinary 
meeting is less or equal to 10% and (6) preemptive rights.  
La Porta et al (1998) 
Creditor Rights  An index of creditor rights equal to the sum of (1) creditor’s consent  
required for reorganization, (2) no automatic stay on assets (3) secured 
creditors paid first and (4) the debtor does not retain the administration of 
its property pending the resolution of the reorganization.  
La Porta et al (1998) 
Legal origin  Dummies identifying the legal origin of the company law or commercial 
code. Dummy for socialist origin is set to one for all transitional economies 
of Eastern Europe and CIS.  
La Porta et al (1998) 
Duration of Entry The time it takes to obtain legal status to operate a firm with limited liability 
involved in industrial or commercial activity, in business days.  
Djankov et al (2003) 
Percent of 
Bankruptcies 
Ration of the number of bankruptcies per year over the total number of 
registered firms in a country in that year, average of 1995-1999. 
Claessens and Klapper (2003) 
Time in 
Bankruptcy 
The average duration of insolvency procedures for a standardize bankruptcy 
case, in number of years. The time measure includes all delay due to legal 
derailment tactics that parties to the insolvency may use. As such, the 
measure represents the actual time of the insolvency proceedings, not the 
time that the law may mandate. 
World Bank (2003) “Doing 




The measure documents the order in which claims are paid in the 
insolvency process. The measure is scaled so that higher values imply 
stricter observance of priority. A 1 on Absolute Priority Preserved means 
that secured creditors are paid before court costs, labor claims and tax 
claims. A 0.67 means that secured creditors get paid second, and 0.33 
means they get paid third. A 0 on Absolute Priority Preserved means that 
secured creditors get paid after all court costs, labor claims, and tax claims 
are satisfied. 
World Bank (2003) “Doing 
Business in 2004: 
Understanding Regulation” 
Institutions   First principal component factor (with factor loadings) of Law and Order 
(0.55), Financial Development (0.43), Corruption (0.47), Duration of Entry 
(-0.44) and Time in Bankruptcy (-0.29).  





Equals to one if the legal organization of the company is corporation and 
zero for partnership or sole proprietorship. 





Dummy variable that takes on the value one if any foreign company or 
individual has a financial stake in the ownership of the firm, zero otherwise. 
WBES 
Exporter dummy  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if firm exports, zero otherwise. WBES 
Manufacturing  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if firm is in the manufacturing 
industry, zero otherwise. 
WBES 
Services  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if firm is in the service 





A firm is defined as small if it has between 5 and 50 employees, medium 
size if it has between 51 and 500 employees and large if it has more than 
500 employees. 
 WBES 
Firm Age  Equals to the log of firm age in years (the difference of 1999 and the firms 




How problematic is financing for the operation and growth of your 
business: no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle (3) or a 
major obstacle (4)? 
 WBES 
Legal Obstacle  How problematic is functioning of the judiciary for the operation and 
growth of your business: no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate 




How problematic is corruption for the operation and growth of your 
business: no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle (3) or a 





How problematic are taxes and regulations for the operation and growth of 
your business: no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle (3) 
or a major obstacle (4)? 
WBES 
Equity finance  Share (percentage) of firm's financing over the last year coming from 
equity, sale of stocks. 
WBES 
Bank finance  Share (percentage) of firm's financing over the last year coming from local 
and foreign commercial banks. 
WBES 
Family finance  Share (percentage) of firm's financing over the last year coming from family 




Share (percentage) of firm's financing over the last year coming from 
retained earnings.  
WBES 
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Table A2: Number of firms by country 
 













Costa Rica  30 
Croatia 87 
Czech Republic  102 
Dominican Republic  43 
Ecuador 49 

























Slovak Republic  93 
Slovenia 91 
Sweden 87 




United Kingdom  66 
Uruguay 39 
Venezuela 14 
All Sample  4206 
   
 